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I. INTRODUCTION
The cat’s paw doctrine is an employment discrimination concept
wherein an employer is held liable for the discriminatory act of a non-firing
agent when that agent’s act caused another, non-discriminatory agent to fire
an employee.1 Under agency law, an employer is generally not liable for an
employee’s actions made outside the scope of the employee’s employment
and conjunctively views an employee’s intentional torts as employee actions
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1
See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
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made outside the scope of employment.2 Under Title VII, discrimination is
an intentional tort.3 Therefore, employees can generally discriminate against
other employees without imputing liability to the employer under Title VII.
However, agency law also provides exceptions to this general rule when
employees are somehow assisted by the employer in carrying out the
intentional tort. Title VII, adopting agency law’s general rule, also adopts
its exceptions. Evolving from a judicial analysis of these agency exceptions,
the cat’s paw doctrine is an important Title VII concept which stretches
employer liability to cover employees indirectly empowered to commit
discriminatory actions against their fellow employees.
Discrimination is an intentional tort.4 For an employer to be liable, the
employer or one of his agents must take an adverse employment action with
the intent to discriminate, which usually requires actions by a
“decisionmaker.” Consider the following scenario:
Steve is a male salesman for the Lucky Shoe Company. Steve’s
supervisor, Bob, distrusts male salesmen because he believes they
are lazy. Bob falsely reports to his supervisor, Kevin, that Steve
has not been meeting his quota. Kevin relies on Bob’s report and
fires Steve for missing the quota. Kevin did not know Steve was
a man, or that Bob hated men, when he fired him. Steve sues the
Lucky Shoe Company for discriminating against him.
Proponents of the cat’s paw theory of liability argue that the Lucky
Shoe Company should be held liable because Steve’s discriminatory
supervisor, Bob, used the decision-maker, Kevin, as a conduit for his
discriminatory intent. Nearly every circuit had adopted a form of
supervisory cat’s paw liability before the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor
Hospital.5
Although the Supreme Court recognized cat’s paw liability in Staub,
the Court limited the ruling to imputing a supervisor’s discriminatory actions
and intent to the employer, even though the decision-maker did not have a
discriminatory motive.6 The Court “express[ed] no view as to whether the
employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed
a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.”7
Recently, several circuits have analyzed Staub to determine whether
cat’s paw liability can apply to co-workers: Velázquez-Perez v. Developers
Diversified Realty Corp. in the First Circuit and Vasquez v. Empress
2
3
4
5
6
7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016).
Id.
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
Id. at 422 n. 4.
Id.
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Ambulance Serv. in the Second Circuit. Both cases applied cat’s paw
liability to co-workers.8
Although the influence for this recent cat’s paw case law should
primarily be the Supreme Court ruling in Staub, both the First and Second
Circuit rely on Staub’s interplay with the generally restrictive ruling (in the
context of the hostile workplace framework) of Vance v. Ball State
University.9 Vance redefines the term “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII’s hostile work environment (hereinafter “Ellerth”)
framework to include only those employees that were “empowered by the
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”10
Thereafter, “supervisors” were defined as employees expressly given the
power to hire, fire, demote, promote, or take any similar significant
employment action.11 Directly applied to the cat’s paw doctrine, Vance
would seem to render Staub, if not superfluous, at least limited in scope
because cat’s paw liability is not needed when an empowered agent takes an
adverse action with the requisite animus. Rather, the theory holds employers
liable despite the absence of empowered agents exhibiting animus. Read
alongside Vance, Staub now seems to hold employers liable for a
supervisor’s actions only when the supervisor, already expressly empowered
to make tangible employment decisions relating to a particular employee,
heavily influences another supervisor’s tangible employment decision that
affects that employee.
Despite this reading, the First and Second Circuits’ recent co-worker
cat’s paw expansion attempts to salvage some remaining precedential value
from Staub. However, this article will argue that both Vazquez and
Velazquez were wrongly decided because applying the Vance supervisor to
the independently developed cat’s paw doctrine increases Ellerth’s
significance far beyond its intended scope. The Vasquez and Velazquez cat’s
paws, in implicitly and explicitly adopting the Ellerth framework to form the
basis for co-worker cat’s paw liability, have irreparably limited cat’s paw
liability.
This article will argue that Vasquez and Velazquez were wrongly
decided and that any further attempt to reconcile Vance with Staub is both
incorrect and unnecessary. Part II of this article will discuss the statutory
evolution of employment discrimination law and the common law evolution

8

Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016); VelázquezPérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir. 2014).
9
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013); see Velázquez-Perez, 753 F.3d at 273–
74 (holding that co-worker cat’s paw liability must be based on the negligence standard
espoused by Vance).
10
Vance, 570 U.S. at 431.
11
Id.
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of the cat’s paw doctrine, comparing the development of the cat’s paw theory
of liability with the development of the Ellerth framework, each culminating
in their respective Supreme Court decisions in Staub and Vance. Part III
analyzes the effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Staub and Vance on
the cat’s paw doctrine and Ellerth framework. Part IV will argue that recent
decisions among the circuits have misinterpreted the interplay between these
decisions.
This article concludes by explaining that reliance on the Ellerth
framework, for the purpose of cat’s paw liability, should be limited to
acknowledgment that negligence is a valid basis for imposing liability on an
employer for the acts of his or her agents. Following an examination of the
relevant statutes and background law, this article will show the following:
(1) the Vance “supervisor” must be limited to the Ellerth framework; (2)
cat’s paw liability cannot support a Vance “supervisor;” and (3) the cat’s paw
theory is better served by continuing the proximate cause standard advanced
in Staub.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE
A. An Overview of Employment Discrimination in the United States
Historically, at-will employment has been the law in the United
States.12 An employer may terminate employment for good reason, bad
reason, or no reason at all.13 Few common law exceptions to the at-will
doctrine exist.
Therefore, wrongfully discharged employees often turn to statutory
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. Numerous federal and state
statutes provide relief for discriminatory employment actions.14 For
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to
discriminate in employment actions based on “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”15 The prevalence of Title VII as a weapon against
employment discrimination is undeniable. In 2015 alone, there were 89,385
individual Title VII charge filings made to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).16
12

Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 707 (2006).
13
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).
14
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (2016); Equal Rights
Under the Law, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 (2016); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §
12101 (2016); see also Cyndi M. Benedict et al., Employment and Labor Law, 52 SMU L.
REV. 1001, 1043, 1058, 1078 (1999) (citing numerous federal statutory exceptions to the atwill doctrine).
15
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
16
Charge Statistics, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
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Title VII rose out of the struggle against segregation in the mid-20th
century. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to combat segregation in public accommodations and all programs funded
by the federal government.17 Initially, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
include what is now Title VII, but Congress recognized that providing equal
employment opportunities was vital to the bill’s purpose.18 The bill also
reflected the concern that employment discrimination was an economic
waste that needed to be remedied.19 Over time, it became clear that federal
courts were to have the vanguard role in enforcing the bill’s provisions and
stamping out employment discrimination.20 Eventually, Congress outlawed
other forms of discrimination, such as age and disability discrimination, by
passing statutes worded similarly to Title VII.21
For the purpose of Title VII, employers include “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such a person.”22
Courts originally interpreted the “any agent” clause as a source of individual
liability against discriminating agents of employers23 Any supervisory agent
of an employer, such as a hiring manager, could be held liable under Title
VII for their discriminatory acts.24 However, federal courts eventually
shifted away from this interpretation in favor of reading the “any agent”
clause as espousing the congressional desire to apply agency principles to
determine an employer’s vicarious liability.25 After this reinterpretation,
individual liability for agents decreased.26 Instead, courts began to apply
agency principles to determine whether liability is imputed onto employers
whose employees commit discrimination.27
The agency principles predominantly used to analyze Title VII
vicarious liability are found in the Second Restatement of Agency:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (receiving employee
request to proceed with a lawsuit).
17
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2.
18
Thelma L. Harmon, What’s My Line: Supervisor or Co-Worker?, 24 TEMP. POL. &
C.R. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2014).
19
Id. at 46.
20
Id. at 47.
21
See 2 U.S.C.S. § 1311 (2016).
22
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
23
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986); Bridges v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
24
See, e.g., Rodgers, 791 F.2d at 442–43.
25
See Meritor Sav. Bank, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
26
See Henry Ting, Who’s the Boss?: Personal Liability Under Title VII and the ADEA,
5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 522 (1996).
27
See id.
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(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.28
Two separate sources of employer liability emerged from these agency
principles: hostile work environment and cat’s paw liability. Although these
theories evolved separately, their common inspiration has caused their
merger in modern legal analysis.
B. A Brief History of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Framework
General employment discrimination cases deal with an employer’s
liability for tangible employment actions, such as hirings, firings, or
demotions. However, Title VII also protects individuals from being
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of their employment.29
Because harassment, notably sexual harassment, is so pervasive within the
employment context, courts needed to determine how to approach cases
where an individual was discriminatorily deprived of a harassment-free
workplace but was not the target of an adverse, tangible employment action.
Eventually, the Supreme Court cemented a framework for establishing
employer liability for hostile work environments in the 1998 twin cases:
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton30 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.31 The
Court held that an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor creates
an actionably hostile work environment.32 However, the employer has a
defense if it did not take a tangible employment action and must show that:
(a) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”33
Nonetheless, when a co-worker creates a hostile work environment, the
employer is liable only if it was negligent in failing to prevent the tortious

28
29
30
31
32
33

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Id. at 765.
Id.
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conduct.34 The Court created this co-worker/supervisor dichotomy by
parsing through vicarious liability in agency law. First, the Court began with
the general idea that sexual harassment, absent any tangible employment
action, “is not conduct within the scope of employment.”35 Employers do
not want their supervisors sexually harassing employees during work hours.
Since employers are not generally liable for employee torts committed
outside the scope of employment, the Court next examined whether there
was an applicable exception to the rule.36 After summarily dismissing the
Second Restatement of Agency section 219(a) and (c) as irrelevant to the
analysis, the Court held that employers should be held liable for their
supervisors’ sexual harassment under section 219(d) (aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation) based on the general
proposition that only “a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority
of the company” can cause a direct economic injury stemming from a
tangible employment action.37 Only a supervisor can fire you, demote you,
or dock your pay.38 A supervisor’s discriminatory harassment takes on a
more sinister tone because the agency relationship intrinsically supports it.
Because a supervisor’s offensive conduct is less likely to be reported
and more likely to make an employee’s work environment uncomfortable,
the Court held that employers should be held vicariously liable when
supervisors create a hostile work environment.39 Employers, however, are
not automatically liable when co-workers create a hostile work environment
absent employer negligence.40
C. The Evolution of Title VII Cat’s Paw Liability
The co-worker/supervisor dichotomy also presented itself in the
evolution of the cat’s paw framework, although most circuits based the cat’s
paw doctrine on an entirely different element of the “supervisory”
relationship.41 Cat’s paw liability is a causation theory that holds an
employer liable “when a supervisor with a discriminatory motive influences,
but does not make, an adverse employment decision against a fellow

34

See id. at 758–59 (“Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under
Title VII.”).
35
Id. at 757.
36
Id. at 758.
37
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 765.
40
Id. at 762.
41
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting how supervisory
employees more readily utilize an employer’s authority when they influence employment
decisions than when they are harassing employees).
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employee.”42 The cat’s paw derives its name from an Aesop fable wherein
a wily monkey convinces a cat to grab chestnuts from a roaring fire.43 The
monkey eats the chestnuts as the cat retrieves them, and the cat is left with
nothing but a burnt paw for his trouble.44
The 1990 case, Shager v. Upjohn Company, injected this myth into the
lexicon of employment law.45 Upjohn involved an employment committee
that fired a salesman, Shager, based on his poor sales and supervisor
reports.46
Unbeknown to the committee, Shager’s supervisor had
purposefully marginalized Shager’s performance due to the supervisor’s
own biased views towards older workers like Shager.47 Judge Richard
Posner held that if the employment committee acted as the conduit for the
supervisor’s discriminatory animus, the employer could be held liable for the
supervisor’s discriminatory motivation.48 In empowering the employee’s
discriminatory intent, the employer played the gullible cat to the
discriminatory supervisor’s wily monkey and allowed the former employee
to burn, or in this case, sue the company.
After Upjohn, the cat’s paw theory of liability spread throughout the
courts.49 Nearly every circuit adopted a form of subordinate bias liability.50
42
John S. Collins, Another Hairball for Employers? “Cat’s Paw” Liability for the
Discriminatory Acts of Co-Workers After Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 908,
909 (2012).
43
THE MONKEY AND THE CAT (AESOP FOR CHILDREN, 1919), http://mythfolklore.net/
aesopica/ milowinter/61.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
44
Id.
45
Upjohn, 913 F.2d at 405.
46
Id. at 400.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 405.
49
Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating
the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C.
L. Rev. 383, 385–86 (2008) (“[s]ince 1990, every federal circuit court of appeals, as well as
the Supreme Court, have endorsed the notion that subordinate bias may be a basis for imputing
liability to an employer in appropriate circumstances.”).
50
See, e.g., Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004)
(establishing a cat’s paw liability similar to the Second Circuit); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d
572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (establishing a two-part test for subordinate bias liability); EEOC v.
Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (establishing a cat’s paw liability
test similar to the one established by the Second Circuit); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 257
F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (establishing that cat’s paw liability exists in the Second Circuit
when an employee has significant influence over the decision-making process); Bergene v.
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001)
(establishing cat’s paw liability when a supervisor was involved in the final decision-making
process); English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding an
identical definition of cat’s paw liability as the Eleventh Circuit); Maarouf v. Walker Mfg.
Co., 210 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2000) (establishing a form of proximate cause liability in the
Seventh Circuit); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)
(adopting cat’s paw liability in cases where a biased supervisor’s recommendation is followed
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However, key differences emerged among the circuits as they developed
their theories of cat’s paw liability. Notably, the circuits differed on the
requisite causal link between a supervisor’s discriminatory action and the
eventual adverse employment action, along with the extent to which an
independent investigation insulated the employer from liability.51
The First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits implemented a lenient causation
standard.52 These circuits adopted a standard that considered whether
discriminatory animus tainted the decision-making process.53 It was enough
that the supervisor had “influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker.”54
The majority of circuits forged stricter answers to the causation
requirement. This approach required more than a simple discriminatory
influence but did not require the supervisor to practically become the
decision-maker.55 In these circuits, a claim would survive summary
judgment if the “biased supervisor played a role in the decisionmaking
process.”56 The Tenth Circuit required a causal connection between the
supervisor’s “reports, recommendations, and actions” and the final
employment decision.57 The Sixth Circuit applied the same standard.58
The Fourth Circuit embraced the strictest standard.59 In Hill v.
Lockheed Martin,60 the Fourth Circuit held that an employer is liable for the
discriminatory actions of a supervisor only when a plaintiff shows that the
supervisor “was the one ‘principally responsible’ for, or the ‘actual
decisionmaker’ behind, the action.”61 In other words, it does not matter that
a supervisor “had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or . . .
played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse employment decision.”62
At its core, the Fourth Circuit was concerned with the Ellerth Court’s
application of general agency principles determining vicarious liability. The
Fourth Circuit believed supervisors were acting within the scope of their
without a follow-up investigation); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d
344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (establishing a causal nexus test for cat’s paw liability).
51
See Abby Bochenek, The Cat’s Revenge: Individual Liability Under the Cat’s Paw
Doctrine, 8 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 120, 125 (2012).
52
See Sean Ratliff, Comment, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for
Employers in Cat’s Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 260 (2009).
53
See Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 2004).
54
Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2002).
55
Ratliff, supra note 52, at 268.
56
Id.
57
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 2006).
58
Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2004).
59
Ratliff, supra note 52, at 263.
60
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004).
61
Id. at 288–89.
62
Id. at 291.
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employment and, thus, subjecting their employers to vicarious liability only
when specifically empowered to make employment decisions.63 Focusing
on Ellerth’s dicta, stating that “only a supervisor can cause [tangible
employment actions],” the Fourth Circuit refused to hold Lockheed Martin
liable for its employee’s action when the employer had not expressly granted
the employee any decision-making authority.64
Other circuits ignored the Supreme Court’s Ellerth distinction,
believing that the court could impute an agent’s discriminatory motives to
the final decision-maker if the plaintiff established a causal link.65 This
rendered any examination of agency principles unnecessary.
The Supreme Court did not resolve the cat’s paw circuit split until 2011
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.66 The Seventh Circuit had affirmed an
employer’s summary judgment motion on appeal, concluding that an
employer’s independent investigation cut off liability for its supervisor’s
discriminatory acts.67 The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.68 In the ensuing decision, the Supreme Court adopted cat’s paw
liability, but it was not in a form that was familiar to any of the circuits.
III. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES ACTION
A. Staub: The Supreme Court Adopts the Cat’s Paw
Vincent Staub was a U.S. Army Reservist who was required to attend
drill camp one weekend per month and train full-time for two to three weeks
a year.69 His immediate supervisor, Janice Mullaly, and her supervisor,
Michael Korenchuk, believed that Staub’s Reservist responsibilities were a
waste of time and a drain on the company.70 Over the course of Staub’s
employment, Mullaly made it clear that she was “out to get him” and once
disciplined him under dubious circumstances.71
On April 2, 2004, one of Staub’s co-workers complained to a human
resources officer, Linda Buck, about Staub’s frequent unavailability.72 Buck
responded by directing Korenchuck and Mullaly to create a plan to solve
Staub’s “availability” problems.73 Three weeks later Korenchuk informed
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998).
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
Staub, 559 U.S. at 1066.
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Buck that Staub had left his desk without informing a supervisor.74 Although
Staub contended that he had left Korenchuk a voice-message detailing his
absence, Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, as well as Mullaly’s
history of discipline, and fired Staub.75 Staub challenged his firing through
the grievance process, claiming that Mullaly had fabricated his previous
demerits, but Staub was unsuccessful.76
Staub subsequently brought suit under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),77 claiming
that Buck fired him due to discriminatory animus toward his armed service
obligations.78 A jury decided in Staub’s favor, finding that Staub’s military
status was “a motivating factor in Proctor Hospital’s decision to discharge
him.”79 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that cat’s paw liability was
appropriate only in cases where the biased supervisor exercised “such
‘singular influence’ over the decisionmaker that the decision to terminate
was the product of ‘blind reliance.’”80 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.81
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began by noting how similarly
Title VII and the USERRA are constructed.82 Specifically, the USERRA
prohibits employer actions if “the person’s membership [in the armed
forces] . . . is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of
such membership.”83 Title VII prohibits employer actions when “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”84
As the Court noted, the question of liability revolved around the
meaning of the phrase, “motivating factor,” in the employment action.85
Staub argued that the supervisors, Mullaly and Korenchuck, were
discriminatorily motivated in filing unfavorable entries in his record,
sufficing to establish a violation of USERRA.86 However, the Court quickly
dismissed the argument, observing that, while filing false reports was an
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Staub, 559 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Staub, 559 U.S. at 415–16.
Id. 413–14.
Id. at 417.
38 U.S.C.S. § 4311(c)(1) (1994).
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (2016).
Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
Id.
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employment action, it was not a significant employment action that would
allow the Court to impute liability to the employer under USERRA.87
Staub’s firing was the significant employment action.88 The Court further
rejected the notion that Korenchuk and Mullaly’s discriminatory motive
could be imputed to Buck’s non-discriminatory action, citing the statutory
language requirement that “discrimination be ‘a motivating factor’ in the
adverse action.”89
The Court continued by summarily dismissing Proctor Hospital’s
interpretations of cat’s paw liability. Proctor Hospital argued that a violation
of USERRA occurs only when the supervisor is the de facto decisionmaker.90 In essence, Proctor Hospital was arguing for the Fourth Circuit’s
strict causation standard. The Court found such a strict test unnecessary.91
This, in essence, dismissed the circuit courts’ lenient and strict standards for
imposing subordinate bias liability.92 Instead, the Court defined cat’s paw
liability as follows: “If a supervisor performs an act motivated by
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”93 Under
this rule, an independent investigation does not shield an employer from
liability unless it breaks the causal connections between the supervisor’s
discriminatory act and the eventual employment action.94
The Supreme Court specifically left unaddressed the possibility of a coworker cat’s paw liability case, only remarking that traditional agency law
must impute liability to the employer for the acts of a discriminatorily
motivated agent.95 Neither did the Court sufficiently define “supervisor,”
noting only that both cat’s paw supervisors and unbiased decision-makers
“possessed supervisory authority delegated by their employer and exercised
it in the interest of their employer.”96 Mulally and Korenchuk acted “within
the scope of their employment” when they reprimanded Staub for violating
company rules.97
87

Id. at 417–18.
Id.
89
Id. at 418 (emphasis omitted).
90
Id. at 419.
91
Staub, 562 U.S. at 419.
92
See id. at 417–19 (dismissing petitioner’s argument that discriminatory intent on the
part of a supervisor could qualify as a “motivating factor,” while simultaneously dismissing
respondent’s argument that cat’s paw liability requires the biased supervisor to be the de facto
decision-maker).
93
Id. at 422 (emphasis omitted).
94
Id. at 421.
95
Id. at 422 n.4.
96
Id. at 422.
97
Id. at 422–23.
88
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Vance: The Supreme Court Tightens the Ellerth Framework
Three years later, the Court decided an Ellerth hostile work
environment case, Vance v. Ball State University,98 which many believed
would answer some of the questions Staub had left unresolved. Maetta
Vance, an African-American woman, worked as a Ball State University
(“BSU”) caterer for over seventeen years.99 Saundra Davis was also
employed as a BSU caterer but at no point had the power to “hire, fire,
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”100 Vance alleged that Davis
made her feel threatened at work by engaging in racially discriminatory
actions such as “glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and
intimidating her.”101 Vance eventually filed charges of racial harassment and
discrimination against BSU, alleging that BSU was liable for the creation of
a racially hostile work environment because Davis was Vance’s
supervisor.102
The Court responded to this weak case for liability under the supervisor
rubric and established a bright-line rule that would allow lower-court judges
to easily determine when an employer is liable for a supervisor’s hostile work
environment.103 “An employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take
tangible employment actions against the victim.”104 A tangible employment
action causes a “significant change in employment status such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”105
As established by the Ellerth framework, an employer is strictly liable
for a supervisor’s discrimination if it culminates in a “tangible employment
action.”106 Otherwise, an employer may escape liability by “establishing, as
an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the
employer provided.”107 Employees who are not supervisors are coworkers.108 By contrast, an employer is responsible for the discriminatory
actions of a co-worker only if the employer is “negligent in controlling
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425.
See id. at 451 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); Id. at 424.
Vance, 570 U.S. at 424.
Id. at 421 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id.
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working conditions.”109
The petitioner argued that no reading of the Ellerth framework
suggested the majority’s strict supervisor definition.110 However, the
majority rejected this argument, claiming supervisory status was not a
contested issue in the previous cases, and the Court was never asked to define
it.111 The Court emphasized that the Ellerth framework mandated a clear
definition of the term “supervisor.”112 However, the Court also posited that
employers who rely on employees to provide them with the facts of an
ultimate firing are, in essence, giving the employees supervisory authority.113
“If an employer does attempt to confine decisionmaking power to a small
number of individuals, those individuals will have a limited ability to
exercise independent discretion when making decisions and will likely rely
on other workers who actually interact with the affected employee.”114 This
language would form the basis for the First and Second Circuits’ future
attempts at synthesizing Staub and Vance.115
B. Synthesis: The Co-Worker Cat’s Paw Doctrine
Following Vance, the various circuits were left without clarification as
to the proper application of the “supervisor” definition to cat’s paw
liability.116 Vance was decided without mentioning cat’s paw liability, but it
did seemingly impose a strict supervisor definition on the entire Title VII
jurisprudence. Eventually, both the First and Second Circuits published
opinions attempting to reconcile Vance with Staub.117
In Velázquez-Pérez, the First Circuit found “limited utility” in a
distinction between Vance hostile workplace claims and the quid pro quo
case presently before it.118 The First Circuit concluded that a jilted human
resources representative, Martinez, was not Velázquez-Pérez’s supervisor,
despite her attempt at retaliation, which consisted of a thorough and
109

Id.
Vance, 570 U.S. at 436.
111
Id. at 438.
112
Id. at 432 (“[T]he framework set out in Ellerth and Faragher presupposes a clear
distinction between supervisors and co-workers.”).
113
Id. at 447.
114
Id.
115
See Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 272 (1st
Cir. 2014); Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 738 (10th Cir. 2014); see
also Burlington v. News Corp., 55 F. Supp. 3d 723, 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
116
See Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., 744 F.3d 948, 955–56 (6th Cir. 2014).
117
Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 265; Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d
267 (2d Cir. 2016).
118
Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 273 (explaining that Vance defines quid pro quo claims
to include claims where employers or their agents take a tangible employment action against
an employee who does not offer sexual favors).
110

NEHME (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

1/16/2019 11:10 AM

CAT’S PAW LIABILITY

77

persistent lobbying effort to get him fired.119 Recognizing that the human
resources representative was not his supervisor, the court held that
Velázquez-Pérez’s employer could still be held liable because the employer
was negligent in allowing Martinez’s persistent and transparent lobbying
efforts to succeed.120 The First Circuit’s opinion synthesized Vance and
Staub. Acknowledging that Vance raised the bar for supervisors, the panel
nevertheless held that employers could also be held liable under a co-worker
cat’s paw theory of liability if they were negligent in allowing the
discriminatory act to cause an adverse employment action.121 The First
Circuit based this co-worker cat’s paw theory on the baseline of negligence
established in the Ellerth framework.122
In Vasquez, the Second Circuit concluded that a discriminating
employee, Gray, was considered a co-worker under Title VII, after Gray’s
attempt to cover-up his sexual harassment of a fellow employee, Vazquez,
led to Vazquez’s firing.123 Nevertheless, while citing to Velázquez-Pérez,
the court found that the employer, Empress, was liable under a co-worker
cat’s paw theory of liability.124 The Second Circuit held that “an employer
may be held liable for an employee’s animus under a ‘cat’s paw’ theory,
regardless of the employee’s role within the organization, if the employer’s
own negligence gives effect to the employee’s animus and causes the victim
to suffer an adverse employment action.”125 Interestingly, the Second Circuit
did not cite Vance when defining the term “supervisor,” nor did the court
question the co-worker status of the discriminatory employee. However, the
Second Circuit did rely on the Ellerth framework to justify the imposition of
a negligence standard upon co-worker cat’s paw liability.126 Furthermore,
the court concurred with the Velázquez-Pérez holding and cited that holding
in forming its own co-worker cat’s paw doctrine.127
The Vance supervisor question operates as the backdrop of both
circuits’ opinions, albeit more explicitly in Velázquez-Pérez than in
Vasquez.128 Although Vance never explicitly mentions Staub, its language

119
Id. at 271–73 (“That she was successful may show that she was a formidable adversary
as a coworker . . . but it does not make her Velázquez’s supervisor as defined in Vance.”).
120
Id. at 274.
121
Id. at 273–74.
122
See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 446–47 (2013) (explaining that
“negligence provides adequate protection for the majority of tort cases”).
123
Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 2016).
124
Id. at 276.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 273–74.
127
Id. at 274.
128
Id.; Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 273 (1st
Cir. 2014).
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suggests a broad interpretation “to all forms of ‘unlawful harassment’” and
an end to the separation of the harassment framework from other
discrimination cases.129 In step with this broad interpretation, the Vance
supervisor has seemingly entrenched itself in any cat’s paw analysis of
retaliation claims in the Second Circuit.130 Given that retaliation claims have
become the most frequently filed charge with the EEOC in recent years, a
sensible framework for the application of cat’s paw liability to retaliation
claims is essential.131 Because a broad application of the Vance supervisor
to cat’s paw liability limits the ability of the cat’s paw doctrine to function
as intended, the holdings in Vasquez and Velázquez must not be narrowly
followed.
IV. FALLOUT: HOW THE CO-WORKER CAT’S PAW DIMINISHES THE
DOCTRINE
A. The Difference Between a Vance and Staub Supervisor
“Supervisor” is not a statutory term.132 The workplace harassment
framework adopted the term to denote employees whose actions imputed
vicarious liability onto their employers.133 Generally, the toxicity of a
worker’s environment and the power of a harasser have a direct, positive
relationship.134 A supervisor capable of firing a worker can poison the
worker’s work environment more effectively than an arbitrary person on the
street, or even the person in the parallel cubicle. “A co-worker can break a
co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor. . . . [b]ut one co-worker (absent
some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can one co-worker
demote another.”135
With this in mind, the Supreme Court adopted the Ellerth framework
under the general proposition that “only a supervisor, or other person acting
with the authority of the company, can cause [tangible employment
decisions].”136 A supervisor’s threat is backed by his or her role in the
129
Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 273 (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 432
(2013)).
130
See Campbell v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 723 F. App’x 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2018);
Moore v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:13-cv-01160, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47129, at *4–5
(D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2018).
131
See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 454 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2013).
132
Vance, 570 U.S. at 436.
133
Id.
134
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (“On the one hand, a
supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.”).
135
Id. at 762.
136
Id.
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company. The supervisor can fire or demote you. For that reason, the
harassing behavior is implicitly more toxic, and it was this toxicity that the
Supreme Court sought to address by holding employers presumptively liable
when a “supervisor” created a hostile work environment.137 The Ellerth
Court needed to address sexual harassment, and its decision is steeped in
judicial economy. The Ellerth supervisor is simply a “term of art” meant to
effectuate a sexual harassment framework that employers could follow to
limit liability.
The definition of “supervisor” under cat’s paw liability necessarily
evolved separately. The cat’s paw doctrine recognized that employees
without express authority to take tangible employment actions still had
implied authority and the ability to cause tangible employment actions.138
As Judge Posner succinctly stated, “[c]oncern with the futility of derivative
liability is absent where the challenged action is not harassment, whether on
sexual or other grounds, by a fellow employee but discharge by a supervisory
employee.”139 Employers typically rely on reports and opinions in making
tangible employment decisions, regardless of whether or not the person in
question is a “supervisor.”140 If an employer can be held liable exclusively
for discriminatory actions taken by employees with express authority,
employers can shield themselves from liability by creating a system wherein
disassociated managers approve discriminatory recommendations without
facing any burden to investigate the claims.141 Consequently, when the
circuits developed their own cat’s paw doctrines, most based their doctrines
around theories of causation wherein the employer had, in effect, delegated
some authority to the non-decision-making supervisor.142 In these cases, the
“elaborate scheme” conjectured in Ellerth is made significantly more simple
through the employer’s delegation of authority.143
The Court decided Staub in light of this history. Justice Scalia
explicitly rebuffed the Ellerth supervisor’s application to cat’s paw, noting
that reliance “on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in
any case of cat’s-paw liability . . . will have effectively delegated the
factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.”144 While
the harassment framework targets a harassing employee’s implied ability to
take an employment action, cat’s paw liability concerns an employee’s

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 404.
Harmon, supra note 18, at 61.
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006)
Id. at 487–88.
See, e.g., id.; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 413–15 (2011).
Staub, 562 U.S. at 421.
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influence over the information that forms the backdrop to that action. With
cat’s paw liability, the employee has “perform[ed] an act motivated by
[discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an
adverse employment action,” and the act in fact does cause an adverse
employment action.145 The power to fire has necessarily been delegated,
whether victims or employers know it or not.
B. Adopting Vance Supervisors Into the Cat’s Paw Framework
Wrongly Makes A Hastily Constructed Framework’s Dicta the
Focal Point of Employment Law
The Ellerth decision was a brazen attempt at judicial lawmaking.
Believing that the lower courts needed exacting guidance in applying agency
law to hostile work environment cases, the Court created a framework
favoring public policy rather than legal sense. Building on the general
proposition that only supervisors could cause employees economic damage,
the Court held that employers were liable when supervisors created hostile
work environments.146 This rule has satisfactorily guided courts in analyzing
hostile work environment claims, but it is based on the legal fiction that only
supervisors can cause employees economic damage.
Basing a legal framework on legal fiction is not damaging on its own.
The Court decided Ellerth to address a specific subset of employment
discrimination law: an employer’s vicarious liability for hostile work
environments. The framework presupposes that creating a hostile work
environment is not conduct within the scope of an agent’s employment, and
it moves to address situations where individuals are harassed without the
company’s input.147 In addressing direct employer discrimination, the
framework is simply referring to its catch-all, a point where analysis within
the framework should end.148 It is not attempting to re-write thirty years of
evolving Title VII case law. Creating legal fiction with clear-cut boundaries
is not damaging to a legal area’s evolution.
But the Ellerth Court clearly did not intend for Ellerth to address
causation limits for the entirety of employment law. The notion that “[o]nly
supervisors can fire employees” is not a holding, nor does it even rise to the
level of dicta.149 It is at best an overgeneralization, one whose application to
employment law is rightfully limited to the framework it created.
145

Id. at 422.
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 762 (1998).
147
Id. at 761–62.
148
See id. at 765 (noting that a lack of any tangible employment action gives employers
a previously unavailable affirmative defense).
149
See id. at 762 (noting a general proposition that “only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury.”).
146
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Numerous circuits correctly dismissed the generalization when they
advanced cat’s paw causation.150 Their use of the term “supervisor” did not
reflect an intention to expand Ellerth’s limited holding to cases outside the
hostile work framework. The circuits were simply referring to employees as
supervisors whose job descriptions included filing reports on other
employees.151 Perhaps they could have called them “overseers.”
The Staub court correctly dismissed the Ellerth generalization in
holding that “[a] ‘reprimand . . . for workplace failings’ constitutes conduct
within the scope of an agent’s employment.”152 In holding an employer
vicariously liable for employees’ “supervisory” acts, when those employees
did not meet the Ellerth supervisor requirements, Staub acknowledged that
its holding was outside the Ellerth framework.
Attaching the Vance holding to Staub’s cat’s paw unacceptably dilutes
the cat’s paw. The First Circuit’s failure to bifurcate the Vance supervisor
from Staub weakens the class of supervisor to which vicarious liability is
attached.153 A supervisor whose very job is to report on an employee’s
progress can purposefully affect the employee’s firing through doctored
reports. But no liability can attach unless the employer had reason to know
that he was biased. The First Circuit’s adoption of the Vance’s definition of
“supervisor” is an outright rejection of Staub and the Supreme Court’s theory
of cat’s paw liability.
The First Circuit based this rejection on the notion that “the language
of Vance” applies to all forms of harassment, including harassment that ends
in a tangible employment action.154 Vance may include in its conception of
harassment those cases where the harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action.155 However, it bases this broad definition of harassment
on a framework-specific presumption from Ellerth that only “supervisors”
could cause tangible employment actions, a presumption that the First
150
See e.g., Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004)
(establishing a cat’s paw liability similar to the Second Circuit); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d
572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (establishing a two-part test for subordinate bias liability); EEOC v.
Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (establishing a cat’s paw liability
test similar to the one established by the Second Circuit); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 257
F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (establishing that cat’s paw liability exists in the Second Circuit
when an employee has significant influence over the decision-making process); Maarouf v.
Walker Mfg. Co., 210 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2000) (establishing a form of proximate cause
liability in the Seventh Circuit); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344,
355 (6th Cir. 1998) (establishing a causal nexus test for cat’s paw liability).
151
See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 583.
152
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 423 (2011) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–99 (1998)).
153
Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir.
2014).
154
Id.
155
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
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Circuit invalidated.156
The Second Circuit does not mention Vance but cites Velázquez-Pérez
and the Ellerth framework approvingly in establishing a baseline negligence
standard for co-worker cat’s paw liability.157 In doing so, the Second Circuit
falls into the same trap of extending cat’s paw liability to co-workers under
a framework established on the proposition that only supervisors have the
apparent power to cause tangible employment actions. This apparent power
did not mean that co-workers cannot instigate tangible employment actions,
but only that the actions and words of supervisors with express power over
hiring and firing are more implicitly threatening. This is the distinction that
the Ellerth harassment framework is designed to tackle.
C. Velázquez, Vasquez & The Co-Worker Cat’s Paw
This article argues for two supervisors in one case. In Velázquez-Pérez,
Martinez was certainly not a supervisor under the Ellerth framework when
she sexually harassed Velázquez-Pérez. Her persistent lobbying efforts to
get him fired are evidence that her words and actions did not constitute the
implicit threats which the Ellerth framework wards against. Her employer
had not granted her sufficient, express firing authority that she could wield
over Velázquez in the workplace.158 But that finding should not preclude a
Staub analysis because her employer had clearly granted her sufficient
authority within its decision-making mechanism to cause the firing.
In Vasquez, the opposite may have been true. Gray may very well have
been a supervisor under the Ellerth framework. Empress had strong reason
to suspect Gray’s discriminatory intent but did not conduct any investigation,
thus de facto “delegat[ing] the power to take tangible employment actions
to” Gray.159 Under Vance, Gray was a sexually harassing supervisor who
took an adverse employment action against Vazquez.160 Empress should be
held vicariously liable under the Ellerth framework.
But Vasquez did not plead that the total lack of an independent
investigation effectively made Gray a Vance supervisor. Rather, Vazquez
pleaded retaliation and the cat’s paw, and Staub does not necessarily
156
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998); Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at
274 (“[A]n employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff’s co-worker makes
statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory reasons and with the intent to cause the
plaintiff’s firing; the co-worker’s discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be
fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker’s acts to achieve their
desired effect though it knows (or reasonably should know) of the discriminatory
motivation.”).
157
Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., 835 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2016).
158
Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 272–73.
159
Vance, 570 U.S. at 447.
160
See Vazquez, 835 F.3d at 269–70.
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preclude her claim.161 Under Staub’s cat’s paw, a dichotomy between
supervisors and co-workers is unnecessary and oddly placed. Employers are
liable under a cat’s paw theory of liability when (1) “a supervisor performs
an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to
cause an adverse employment action, and (2) that act is a proximate cause of
the ultimate employment action.”162 Yet, Staub’s supervisors took advantage
of reporting and disciplinary measures that are often made available to the
entirety of the workplace.163 Indeed, one of Staub’s co-workers, Angie Day,
complained to human resources about his frequent absences.164 It is entirely
possible that her comments could constitute the proximate cause that Justice
Scalia envisioned. And, in Vasquez, Gray’s actions were presumably only
feasible because he took advantage of Empress’ sexual harassment policy or
reporting system.
There are significant real-world consequences to a cat’s paw without a
supervisor/co-worker dichotomy. Such a broad cat’s paw could expose
employers to massive liability. Employers may become more hesitant to
credit the opinions of low-level employees, and workplace cohesion might
suffer. Accordingly, this article does not argue against the possibility of a
negligence-based cat’s paw doctrine. In fact, it would be entirely plausible
for courts to hold that co-workers cannot take advantage of the employeremployee relationship for the purpose of cat’s paw.165 This article argues
only against the implementation of the co-worker cat’s paw created in the
First and Second Circuits, which would apply a specific framework’s limited
terms of vicarious liability to an entire field of law. Vance’s holding should
be limited to the framework from which it is derived, and the cat’s paw
should not be reversed, absent a Supreme Court decision holding otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
The First and Second Circuits have ostensibly reversed cat’s paw
liability. In attempting to overcome Vance’s strict “supervisor” definition,
the circuits empowered the cat’s paw to reach the discriminatory actions of
co-workers. But in doing so, the circuits have unnecessarily adopted a
framework which negates cat’s paw liability in a majority of cases.
This article advocates for a strict interpretation of Vance: limiting its
supervisor exception to the Ellerth framework, which presupposes several
generalizations, most importantly the non-existence of Staub cat’s paw
liability. Title VII employment law does not require, nor should it want, a
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 274–78.
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 414.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).

NEHME (DO NOT DELETE)

84

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/16/2019 11:10 AM

[Vol. 43:1

universal definition of supervisor. If one is desired, Congress should amend
Title VII.
The Ellerth framework is designed to deal with a specific type of injury
and concerns itself with the specific employees especially attuned to causing
that injury: those employees who seemingly have the power to take tangible
employment actions at will. The cat’s paw theory of liability is concerned
with another employee, the employee with the power, patent or latent, to
influence the final employment actions of his employer. In bifurcating the
two lines of cases and their respective supervisors, this article acknowledges
the different statutory histories and legal uses of cat’s paw and hostile
workplace liability. It now asks the circuit courts to do so as well.

